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Abstract
Do poor people benefit more or less than the nonpoor from an expansion in
access to public services? And do those benefits depend on the existing level
of access? Answering these questions is essential to strategies for empowering
(or “investing in”) poor people, but the lack of panel data or repeated cross-
sectional data in poor countries has often made it impossible. This paper pro-
poses a methodology for answering these questions using data from only a
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single cross-section survey. We argue that the methodology may be useful for
monitoring the allocation of public expenditures in a context of decentraliza-
tion, and we demonstrate this by applying it to local-level data from Bolivia
and Paraguay. The results indicate that the marginal benefit incidence is
higher (or at least not systematically lower) for the poor than for the nonpoor
in education, but this is not the case for many basic infrastructure services.
More generally, the poor seem to gain access only once the nonpoor already
have high levels of access. This suggests that pro-poor policies must be imple-
mented if the poor are to reap the benefits of gains in access faster.
Latin America has made substantial movement toward decentraliza-
tion during the 1990s (Burki, Perry, and Dillinger 1999). As a result,
expenditures for education, health, and access to basic infrastructure
services tend to be managed more and more at the local level.
Argentina and Brazil were among the first countries to decentralize,
and other countries have followed suit. The best-known recent exam-
ple is probably Mexico (Giugale and Webb 2000), although smaller
countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay, have also adopted decentral-
ization laws.
Two of the main arguments in favor of decentralization are related
to the ideals of efficiency and empowerment. From an efficiency point
of view, it is often argued that local authorities have better information
than central governments for deciding what types of programs and
policies to implement, and how to target these interventions so that the
poor benefit from them. From an empowerment perspective, it is also
argued that providing resources and delegating decisions at the local
level is good in itself because it lets local communities decide what
they want and how to achieve their goals. When mechanisms are
designed to channel more resources to poorer municipalities, decen-
tralization has the potential to empower the poor.1
Although the flow of financial resources to local authorities has
increased considerably in Latin America over the last decade, good
accountability mechanisms by which the allocation of the funds at the
local level may be monitored are still missing. In Mexico, for example,
allocations to states and municipalities for new basic social infrastruc-
ture are now based on a formula that takes into account unmet basic
needs. The formula has dramatically increased funding for the poorest
1. For a discussion of empowerment in the context of poverty reduction, see
World Bank (2002).
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states. One remaining challenge, however, is to design appropriate
institutional management and control mechanisms to ensure that the
funds are well spent. Many local governments lack the expertise and
personnel to manage the funds, and few resources have been made
available to help them hire new staff, train existing staff, or modernize
their administration. Another potential danger lies in the risk of a
political use of the funds at the local level, especially in states and
municipalities where control mechanisms by civil society are weak.
Another important issue with the trend toward decentralization in
Latin America is whether the funds allocated to local authorities bene-
fit the poor, which would “empower” them. To measure who benefits
from an increase in access to public services made feasible by the
financial transfers to local authorities, it was necessary to conduct a
marginal benefit incidence analysis. While traditional benefit inci-
dence analysis provides information on who the current beneficiaries
of access to public services are, marginal benefit incidence analysis
focuses on the beneficiaries of improvements in access. In principle, to
measure the distribution of gains in access, panel data—or at least
repeated cross-sectional data—are necessary. In many countries, how-
ever, such data are not available, or are not comparable over time. The
question, then, is whether marginal benefit incidence can be measured
with a single cross-section of data. Following work by Lanjouw and
Ravallion (1999), this paper argues that it is indeed feasible to measure
marginal benefit incidence with a single cross-section of data. A key
difference between this paper and previous work is that within the
context of decentralization, we focus on marginal benefit incidence at
the local, rather than at the national, level. Another difference is that
we analyze marginal benefit incidence in a broader social welfare
framework that takes into account relative deprivation, whereby indi-
viduals and households assess their level of well-being not only in
absolute terms, but also by comparing themselves to others, the “oth-
ers” being defined here as their geographic neighbors.
Our empirical work is based on household survey data from Bolivia
and Paraguay, two countries that made substantial efforts toward
decentralization in the 1990s.2 The administrative structure of Bolivia
consists of 9 departments and 311 municipalities. Decentralization has
2. For the brief review of the decentralization process in the two countries
that follows, we are indebted to Diego Zavaleta for Bolivia and Estanislao
Gacitua-Mario for Paraguay.
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been promoted in this country through three main laws. First, in 1994,
the Popular Participation Law doubled the share of national income
channeled to local authorities, and modified the allocation mechanism
from a formula based on local tax generation to a distribution accord-
ing to population. The law also transferred to local authorities the
management of the health and educational infrastructure, as well as
that of local roads and sanitation systems. Second, the Administrative
Decentralization Law adopted in 1995 redefined the departmental
level by merging existing public organizations into prefectures. The
law also transferred public investment responsibilities and resources
to the departments, and it created coordination mechanisms with local
(that is, municipal) authorities. Third and last, the National Dialogue
Law adopted in July 2001 completed the transfer of the management
of current expenditures for education and health to the municipalities.
As in Mexico, the law also established a resource allocation criterion
whereby municipalities with high rates of poverty receive a larger
share of the debt relief transfers provided by the international com-
munity to the country as part of its participation in the Highly
Indebted and Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
In Paraguay, departments and municipalities have also acquired
important responsibilities and autonomy. Paraguay is composed of 16
departments, plus the capital city of Asunción, and 220 municipalities.
According to the 1992 constitution, departments and municipalities
have political, administrative, and financial autonomy. The depart-
mental government consists of a governor and a departmental council
(junta departamental) elected by popular vote to serve 5-year terms. The
municipal government consists of a mayor (intendente) and a munici-
pal council (junta municipal). The functions of the departments include
(a) the coordination with the municipal governments of the delivery of
public services, such as water, electricity, and others, that by their char-
acteristics involve more than one municipality; (b) the preparation
with the junta departamental of departmental development plans with
a budget; and (c) the coordination with the central government of the
provision of health and education services. Municipal governments
are responsible for urban development and zoning, public education,
health, water, sanitation, and social services, as well as the mainte-
nance of municipal roads and public infrastructure.
Because Bolivia and Paraguay have both made important strides in
the decentralization process, they represent interesting case studies for
analyzing the marginal benefit incidence analysis of public services at
the local level. It is important, however, to stress several of the limita-
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tions of this paper. The main limitation is that we do not claim that the
analysis provided here constitutes a thorough evaluation of the local
allocation mechanisms observed in the two countries. A more detailed
analysis would have to be undertaken to perform such an evaluation,
especially given that there may be a disconnect between the responsi-
bilities granted in principle to local authorities and the reality.3
A second limitation of the paper is that we focus on the measure-
ment of the marginal benefit incidence at the local level rather than on
the determinants of the local allocation of resources. As noted by
Ajwad and Wodon (2001), a sizable literature explains the allocation of
public services across and within jurisdictions. Tiebout (1956) has
argued that if the residents of different areas value public services at
different levels, varying levels of public provision should be allocated
across areas, with voters sorting themselves into areas where the level
of public goods and services maximize their utility (for more recent
work along these lines, see Brueckner (2000); Hoxby (2000); Behrman
and Craig (1987)). An unequal allocation of services between or even
within areas (say, by municipality within a department) may also
result from assigning weights to different groups in the objective func-
tion of local governments (for example, Ravallion and Wodon 2000,
Ajwad 1999, Shoup 1989). Another strand of research argues that if the
cost of providing public services varies from one area to another, this
may also lead to different levels of provision across and within areas
(for example, Hoxby 1999; Ajwad and Wodon 2001). This unequal allo-
cation may be observed even if voters are homogenous in their prefer-
ences and governments weigh welfare gains equally across regions.
Finally, a cautionary note should be struck about the difference
between locally based and nationally based marginal benefit incidence
analysis. In general, one cannot assume that the results of a locally
based analysis apply at the national level and vice versa. Assume, for
example, that the unit of analysis at the local level is the department,
such that households are ranked in various income groups (say, quin-
3. In Paraguay, for example, the decentralization process has been hindered
by a lack of financial resources, a lack of professional staff, and a lack of clear
organic laws. As mentioned earlier, departmental governments should in
principle get substantial resources from the central government. In reality
however, even though departmental funding has increased, the central gov-
ernment continues to control most of the resources, and transfers at the local
level do not necessarily take needs into account.
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tiles) within their department. This method of ranking has its benefits
in the context of the evaluation of local allocation patterns. It must be
noted, however, that although the poorest household in the richest
department may be richer than the richest household in the poorest
department, they will be treated in the same way in a locally based
analysis, which may not be appropriate for an assessment of marginal
benefit incidence at the national level. On the other hand, in a decen-
tralized environment, or in a cross-country study, we believe that a
local ranking is more appropriate.
An important result is that marginal benefit incidence at the local
level appears to be strongly pro-poor only when the level of access (the
benefit incidence) is very high. In primary education for example,
where access rates are high, the poor do benefit much more than the
nonpoor from increases in access. By contrast, for telephones, where
access rates remain low, the nonpoor benefit from the bulk of the gains
in access. Thus, a threshold effect exists (as pointed out by an anony-
mous referee), whereby the poor gain in access only once the nonpoor
already have fairly high levels of access. This does not imply that local
authorities favor the nonpoor. As discussed in Ajwad and Wodon
(2001), the observation that, in general, gains in access to education are
more pro-poor than gains in access to basic infrastructure is consistent
with a policy by local authorities to maximize local access rates (that
is, a policy that specifically targets neither the poor nor the non-poor).
The results, however, do suggest that active pro-poor policies may be
needed if the poor are to reap the benefits of increases in access earlier
in the process of expanding access.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section presents a sim-
ple social welfare framework in which to consider marginal benefit
incidence analysis. Together with a technical appendix, the next sec-
tion presents the methodology used to estimate the marginal benefit
incidence of public services. This is followed by the results for Bolivia
and Paraguay. The paper concludes with a summary of the findings.
Analytical Framework
In this section, we provide a simple analytical framework for analyz-
ing the inequality in the distribution of access to basic services and the
impact on inequality of the distribution of new access.4 The objective
4. The framework follows Siaens and Wodon (2002).
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is to provide summary statistics to identify the current beneficiaries of
access, and the beneficiaries of an increase in access. To use the tools
developed for traditional welfare analysis, the simplest way to pro-
ceed is to assume that we know the value of access to a service, and
that this value has been incorporated into the income or consumption
aggregate of the household. In other words, because access to primary
education for children or a connection to the electricity grid has a cer-
tain value for a household, this value is considered an income source.
We also assume that access means usage (because it is usage that typ-
ically generates value), such that take-up of the service among those
who have access does not need to be considered. Finally, we do not
discuss the fees that users may have to pay for access. The bottom line
of all these assumptions is that we limit our analysis to the distribu-
tional characteristics of who has access now and who gains access at
the margin when access rates are improved.
If we denote by y¯ the mean income (per capita or per equivalent
adult) in the population and by F(y) the normalized rank of a house-
hold (weighted by the household’s size and expansion factor) in the
distribution of income (this rank takes a value of zero for the poorest
household and one for the richest), the Gini coefficient of inequality,
denoted by Gy, is defined as
(1)
When combined with mean income, the Gini coefficient can be used
to derive the following social welfare function:
(2)
In this function, a higher mean income leads to a higher level of
social welfare. Higher inequality lowers social welfare. Sen (1976) and
Yitzhaki (1982) provide different rationales for the use of this welfare
function. In the case of Yitzhaki, the rationale relies on relative depri-
vation theory, whereby people assess their welfare in part by compar-
ing themselves with others, which seems appropriate in a decentraliza-
tion context if the peer comparison group is geographically defined.5
G
y F y
yy =
( )[ ]2 cov ,
W y Gy= −( )1
5. For a derivation of the connection between relative deprivation and the
Gini coefficient, see Chakravarty (1990) and Yitzhaki (1982). Ebert and Moyes
(2000) offer an axiomatic characterization.
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The benefits from access to a service are denoted by xA. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the level of the benefits, denoted by B, is the
same for all those who have access.6 That is, if A is a dichotomous vari-
able that denotes access, following Siaens and Wodon (2002), we have
the following:7
(3)
The Gini income elasticity (GIE hereafter) of the benefits from access
to the service is then
(4)
where x¯A is the mean benefit from access computed across the popula-
tion as a whole, including those who do not have access (that is, if the
share of the population with access is denoted by p,  x¯A = B * p). When
considering a new project, only the additional access provided by the
project should be taken into account in the evaluation of the project’s
impact on the distribution of income. Yet equation (4) is useful to
assess the project’s distributional implications when new access is dis-
tributed in the same way as current access. Using a result from
Yitzhaki (1999), it can be shown that if those gaining new access to the
service have the same position in the distribution of income as those
who currently have access, increasing access at the margin by multi-
plying the share of households with access by 1 + ∆, with ∆ small, will
generate a gain in social welfare equal to
(5)
Of course, new access need not be distributed in the same way as
current access. Imagine, for example, that new access to the service is
distributed randomly among the households without access. In this
x B if A
x if A
A
A
= =
= =

1
0 0
ηA
A
A
x F y
y F y
y
x
=
( )[ ]
( )[ ]
cov ,
cov ,
dW x G
A A
y= ( ) −( )∆ 1 η
6. For a discussion of the impact of considering different values of the ben-
efits for different households, see Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002a, 2002b).
7. If the willingness to pay for a service varies between households, the
value of access to a service should not be constant across the sample (Siaens
and Wodon 2002). Here, however, we focus on access as a dichotomous vari-
able, without taking into account potential differences in the value of access
between households.
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case, the GIE for the benefits of new access would be equal to the fol-
lowing:8
(6)
where
(7)
To find the impact on social welfare of the distribution of new access
specified by (7), it suffices to replace ηA by ηNA in equation (5). Note
also that if p is the population share with access, we have the following:
(8)
Although the distribution of new access could follow the pattern of
current access, or of the current lack of access, it could also follow any
other pattern. If we denote by xMA (where MA stands for marginal
access) the benefits from the actual new pattern of access, the GIE that
we are interested in, is
(9)
Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis with a Single 
Cross-Section of Data
With a single cross-section of data, estimating ηA and ηNA is easy.
Information on marginal benefit incidence, however, is needed to estimate
ηMA. This typically requires panel data, or at least repeated cross-sections
to look at the distribution of changes in access over time. Unfortunately,
panel data or repeated cross-sections are often not available in developing
countries. Even when repeated cross-sections are available, they are often
not comparable. This section discusses how to estimate the marginal ben-
efit incidence of new access with a single cross-section of data.
8. In equations (6) and (7), the value of B is not actually part of the income
aggregate of those who do not have access, and it remains included in the
income aggregate of those who have access through the variable xA. For com-
puting the GIE at the margin, the expression is nevertheless appropriate.
ηNA
NA
NA
x F y
y F y
y
x
=
( )[ ]
( )[ ]
cov ,
cov ,
x if A
x B if A
NA
NA
= =
= =

0 1
0
η ηA NAp p* *+ −( ) =1 0
ηMA
MA
MA
x F y
y F y
y
x
=
( )[ ]
( )[ ]
cov ,
cov ,
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Two papers—Ajwad and Wodon (2001) and Lanjouw and Ravallion
(1999)—have proposed methodologies that use a single cross-section
of data to identify the distribution of increases, at the margin, in access
rates to public services or in outlays for social programs. Both studies
used the variation in access rates across regions in a country to capture
the expected evolution of access over time, assuming that the distribu-
tion of new access in lagging regions will follow the pattern observed
in regions where access rates are higher.
At the conceptual level, the approaches used by Ajwad and Wodon
(2001) and Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) differ in the method used for
ranking individuals, municipalities, or any other entities that are the
basic units of observations. Lanjouw and Ravallion classify individu-
als as poor or rich according to their rank in the national distribution
of income. Ajwad and Wodon classify individuals according to their
rank in the local (that is, departmental) distribution of income, rather
than at the national level. Under a decentralized system of govern-
ment, a local ranking may be more appropriate. The social welfare
framework presented above also stresses relative deprivation, which
leads to a local ranking if the peer groups, according to which indi-
viduals assess their welfare, are geographically defined. For an assess-
ment of the national impact of policies, however, a national ranking is
probably more suitable.
At the empirical level, two differences exist between the approach of
Ajwad and Wodon (2001) and that of Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999). The
first difference lies in the manner in which the endogeneity bias in the
estimation of the marginal benefit incidence analysis is dealt with. The
technique used in both papers consists of regressing the access rate in a
given quintile against the mean access rate. The mean access rate, how-
ever, includes information from the access rates in each quintile. To purge
the mean from this endogeneity, Ajwad and Wodon use the leave-out
mean as their right-hand side variable. That is, the access rate in any
given quintile is regressed against the average of the access rates across
all quintiles, except for the quintile for which the regression is performed.
Lanjouw and Ravallion, on the other hand, use an instrumental tech-
nique, whereby the actual mean is instrumented by the leave-out mean.
The second difference is that Ajwad and Wodon constrain the estimates
of the marginal benefit incidence analysis to sum to one, and show that
without such a constraint, the estimates will be biased downward.9
9. The estimates reported in Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) are lower than
one on average, but it would be easy to apply a similar constraint for their esti-
mation.
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This paper uses the method proposed by Ajwad and Wodon (2001).
The method is outlined in some detail in the appendix. One last
methodological issue must be dealt with before presenting the results.
The method for estimating marginal benefit incidence provides infor-
mation at the quintile level, not at the household level. This is the level
of aggregation that must be used to compute the GIE for the distribu-
tion of improvements in access. It is well known that using group data
implies a downward bias in estimates of inequality because the
within-group component of the inequality measure is ignored. Wodon
and Yitzhaki (2002c), however, show that using aggregate data for the
estimation of the GIE rather than the Gini itself need not necessarily
lead to a large bias. In this paper, since we estimate the GIE for mar-
ginal increases in access using quintile data, we also estimate with
quintile data the GIE for the current distribution of access, and for an
increase in access that would be randomly distributed among those
who do not currently have access.
Empirical Results
The data employed, for both Bolivia and Paraguay, are nationally rep-
resentative households surveys. In Bolivia, for education, we use the
1997 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo. For access to basic infrastructure, we
use the 1999 Encuesta Continua de Hogares—Condiciones de Vida.10 In
Paraguay, we use the 1999 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares. In each
country, the household-level observations are divided into five income
intervals, or quintiles, with the ranking being local (the quintiles are
defined within departments). As mentioned earlier, Bolivia has 9
departments, and Paraguay has 16. The question we are trying to
answer is whether, at the local level, poorer households benefit more
or less than other households from an increase in access to a number
of public goods or services.
Table 1 presents basic statistics on access. The variables can be
divided into two clusters, namely, enrollment in various education
cycles and access to basic infrastructure services. In the education clus-
ter, the preschool, primary school, and secondary school net enroll-
ment rates are defined as the number of children of the appropriate
age enrolled at each level of schooling divided by the number of stu-
10. We use the 1997 Bolivian survey for the education indicators because in
the 1999 survey, due to the formulation of the questionnaire, the measures of
school enrollment for the children are affected by holidays.
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dents who fall into the appropriate age category. In the basic infra-
structure cluster, access rates of electricity, pipe water, sewerage, and
telephone are computed by dividing the number of households with
access by the total number of households.
In Bolivia, the average enrollment rates are 89.7 percent and 48.7
percent for primary schools and secondary schools, respectively.
Preschool enrollment appears to be very low, at 6.1 percent, but this
may be because the questionnaire asks about enrollment only among
children of at least five years of age. In Paraguay, the average enroll-
ment rates are 22.0 percent, 94.8 percent, and 38.7 percent for
preschools, primary schools, and secondary schools, respectively. In
Bolivia, 71 percent of all households are connected to the electricity
grid, 67 percent have access to pipe water, 40 percent have sewerage
access, and about a quarter of all households have a telephone. The
proportions for Paraguay are similar with access to electricity, water,
sewerage, and telephone at 88 percent, 40 percent, 69 percent, and 18
percent, respectively. Table 1 also indicates that access rates vary
widely by income quintile. As expected, a strong positive correlation
exists between the levels of access to public services and per capita
TABLE 1.  BENEFIT INCIDENCE ANALYSIS (SHARE OF POPULATION OR
HOUSEHOLDS WITH ACCESS)
Income Bolivia
quintile Preschools Primary Secondary Electricity Water Sewerage Telephone
Poorest 0.048 0.852 0.241 0.372 0.382 0.136 0.036
Q2 0.058 0.888 0.425 0.643 0.585 0.246 0.087
Q3 0.066 0.907 0.520 0.808 0.743 0.400 0.191
Q4 0.054 0.923 0.580 0.904 0.827 0.590 0.358
Richest 0.090 0.947 0.686 0.974 0.933 0.801 0.708
Mean 0.061 0.897 0.487 0.711 0.668 0.403 0.246
Paraguay
Preschools Primary Secondary Electricity Water Sewerage Telephone
Poorest 0.212 0.914 0.255 0.790 0.178 0.465 0.032
Q2 0.188 0.926 0.326 0.847 0.312 0.610 0.090
Q3 0.198 0.979 0.358 0.922 0.452 0.766 0.206
Q4 0.277 0.976 0.481 0.943 0.545 0.811 0.264
Richest 0.292 0.982 0.594 0.954 0.701 0.914 0.447
Mean 0.220 0.948 0.387 0.882 0.407 0.688 0.183
Source: Authors’ estimation from Bolivia’s 1997 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Bolivia’s
1999 Encuesta Continua de Hogares—Condiciones de Vida, and Paraguay’s 1999 Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares.
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income. Enrollment rates in preschools, primary schools, and sec-
ondary schools increase with household income. The same is
observed for access to electricity, pipe water, sewerage, and tele-
phones.
The data in table 1 provide measures of mean benefit incidence
(current access rates), but they do not inform us about the distribution
of marginal gains in access when overall access rates are increased. To
obtain marginal benefit incidence indicators, we proceeded as
explained in the appendix. The marginal benefit incidence indicators
provided in table 2 have been normalized, such that a value of one
means that the households in a given income quintile benefit as much
as the average household from an increase in access. If the marginal
benefit incidence is below (or above) one, it means that the house-
holds in that income quintile benefit less (or more) from an increase in
access than the average household. For example, the households in
the first quintile in Paraguay benefit less than the average household
from increases in access (or usage) for preschools, water, and tele-
phone; more than the average household for access to primary edu-
cation; and about as much as the average household for increases in
access to secondary education and sewerage. Importantly, even when
TABLE 2.  NORMALIZED MARGINAL BENEFIT INCIDENCE COEFFICIENTS
Income Bolivia
quintile Preschools Primary Secondary Electricity Water Sewerage Telephone
Poorest 1.144 1.816 1.327 1.228 1.037 0.801 0.665
Q2 1.287 0.613 1.361 1.414 1.482 0.716 0.234
Q3 1.216 1.180 1.744 1.215 1.312 1.359 1.444
Q4 0.897 0.897 0.581 0.645 0.794 1.348 1.851
Richest 0.457 0.495 -0.014 0.497 0.374 0.776 0.807
Mean 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Paraguay
Preschools Primary Secondary Electricity Water Sewerage Telephone
Poorest 0.785 2.019 0.955 1.218 0.697 0.996 0.368
Q2 0.875 0.558 1.314 1.437 1.056 1.314 0.760
Q3 1.169 0.494 1.208 1.074 1.174 1.120 1.125
Q4 0.894 1.164 0.746 0.744 1.084 0.963 1.318
Richest 1.277 0.764 0.776 0.527 0.989 0.608 1.428
Mean 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Source: Authors’ estimation from Bolivia’s 1997 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Bolivia’s
1999 Encuesta Continua de Hogares—Condiciones de Vida, and Paraguay’s 1999 Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares.
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the marginal benefit incidence suggests that the poor benefit less than
the nonpoor from gains in access, the poor still benefit more at the
margin than they do currently. (See figure 1, which presents graphs of
most of the results presented in tables 1 and 2. All estimates in figure
1 are normalized, that is, divided by the mean access or increase in
access.)
In most cases, the marginal benefit incidence analysis gives similar
results for Bolivia and Paraguay. Improvements in access to primary
school are the most pro-poor, simply because most other groups of
households already have access. Improvements in access to telephones
are the least pro-poor, because in this sector, even those in the highest
quintiles still lack universal access. Electricity and secondary schooling
tend to be pro-poor at the margin, whereas the distribution of the gains
in access for water and sewerage are more evenly distributed.
To summarize the quintile data provided in tables 1 and 2, we pres-
ent GIEs in table 3. As discussed earlier, the GIE for access captures
the current distribution of access. The GIE for lack of access represents
how redistributive a marginal increase in access would be if it were
distributed randomly among the households that do not currently
have access. Because those with access tend to be less poor than those
without access, the GIE for the lack of access is smaller (that is, more
redistributive at the margin) than the GIE for the current pattern of
access. The GIEs for the marginal benefit incidence are our estimates
for the distribution at the margin of the gains in access. These GIEs are
based on the marginal benefit incidence estimates presented in table
2. In most cases, the GIE for the marginal benefit incidence is within
the interval provided by the GIE for the current pattern of access and
the GIE for the lack of access. This is not very surprising, given that
the richer among those who do not have access have a higher proba-
bility of getting access once access rates are improved. In Bolivia,
however, for the three education indicators, the GIE for the marginal
benefit incidence is slightly more pro-poor than if the gains in access
were randomly distributed among those who currently do not have
access.
Finally, figure 2 presents a scatter plot with the GIEs for all the ser-
vices and for the two countries as a function of the mean access rate. A
second order polynomial is fitted through the scatter plot to suggest
the relationship. Services with low access rates have higher GIEs than
services with low access rates. In other words, the higher the mean
benefit incidence of the public service, the more pro-poor will be the
distribution at the margin of an increase in access. For instance, pri-
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TABLE 3.  GINI INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR THE MARGINAL BENEFIT
INCIDENCE
Bolivia
With access Without access Marginal benefit
Preschool 0.200 –0.013 –0.268
Primary 0.038 –0.335 –0.358
Secondary 0.326 –0.309 –0.526
Electricity 0.289 –0.712 –0.313
Water 0.282 –0.568 –0.283
Sewerage 0.583 –0.393 0.082
Telephone 0.921 –0.300 0.267
Paraguay
With access Without access Marginal benefit
Preschool 0.175 –0.049 0.155
Primary 0.031 –0.557 –0.294
Secondary 0.334 –0.210 –0.143
Electricity 0.061 –0.456 –0.265
Water 0.402 –0.276 0.078
Sewerage 0.204 –0.450 –0.144
Telephone 0.699 –0.157 0.343
Source: Authors’ estimation from Bolivia’s 1997 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Bolivia’s
1999 Encuesta Continua de Hogares—Condiciones de Vida, and Paraguay’s 1999 Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares.
FIGURE 2.  GINI INCOME ELASTICITY FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
GAINS IN ACCESS AND ACCESS LEVELS 
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mary schools in Bolivia and Paraguay have enrollment rates of 95 per-
cent and 90 percent, respectively, according to the surveys, and GIEs
are –0.294 and –0.386. The negative relation between the benefit inci-
dence and the GIEs suggests that on average, the very poor start to
benefit from public services only once the services are widely available
to the nonpoor.
Conclusion
Within the context of decentralization in Latin America, the allocation
of investments at the local level is an important decision for policy-
makers. Although funding for municipalities and departments has
been increasing over time, good monitoring systems to assess how
these funds are spent are lacking. The risk of capture by the better-off
of the funds allocated to the social sectors and to the provision of basic
infrastructure services may well be larger at the local level than at the
national level. This is why it is important to provide good methodolo-
gies for measuring the distribution of the benefits from public expen-
ditures at the local level.
This paper has proposed one such methodology. When it is applied
at the departmental level (as we did in the empirical work), the
methodology provides estimates of how, on average across all depart-
ments, increases in access to basic services are distributed within
departments. To obtain measures of marginal incidence at a lower
administrative level, the methodology could be applied by ranking
households within their municipality instead of their department. In
any case, the main empirical result of the paper is that the poor, and
especially the very poor, appear to benefit from an increase in access to
public services only once the nonpoor are already well served. In pri-
mary education, for example, the poor benefit more than the nonpoor
from gains in access, because coverage is already high. In basic infra-
structure services, however, the nonpoor continue to reap a large part
of the gains in access.
If the objective is to reach the very poor, the results may inform pri-
ority sectors of investments, even though considerations other than
marginal benefit incidence estimates should, of course, be reviewed
before making sectoral policy choices. The results need not indicate
that local governments favor the nonpoor, but they do suggest the
need for pro-poor policies to accelerate the speed at which the poor
benefit from the expansion of public social services.
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Appendix: Estimation Procedure for the Marginal Benefit
Incidence Analysis
Following Ajwad and Wodon (2001), consider a country with i = 1, …,
N departments, and a number of households within each department.
The households are ranked by per capita income and assigned to one
of q = 1, …, Q income intervals. The ranking is done locally, which
means that the intervals are defined within departments. We denote by
xqij the benefit incidence of a program or service in household j belong-
ing to interval q and living in department i. This benefit incidence
reflects the share of the population with access to the public program
or service. The mean benefit incidence in interval q for households in
department i is denoted by Xqi , and the overall department mean is
denoted by X¯i . If J
q
i is the number of households in interval q for depart-
ment i, the two means are respectively equal to the following:
(A.1)
(A.2)
To estimate the marginal benefit incidence, that is, who gains from
an expansion in the program or service, we use the geographic varia-
tion in access both between households and between departments as a
source of information for understanding the diffusion process that
generates access. This is done by regressing the incidence in each of the
intervals in the departments against the departmental means, using Q
regressions:
(A.3)
To avoid endogeneity, the right-hand side variable is computed at
the departmental level as the mean on all the households, except for
those belonging to interval q. Pooling all observations from the various
intervals together, we estimate one regression:
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(A.4)
In equation (A.4), the intercepts and slopes are allowed to differ for
each interval, but there is an implicit restriction. It must be that across
the various intervals, the average marginal increase in access from a
unitary increase in mean access is one. It can be shown that the restric-
tion is as follows:
(A.5)
Writing βQ, the parameter for interval Q in relation to the other
parameters, yields the following:
(A.6)
To take into account the restriction (A.6), (A.4) is estimated with
nonlinear least squares. It can also be shown that a change in benefit
incidence for the households belonging to quintile q in response to an
increase in the aggregate incidence is as follows:
(A.7)
The right-hand side values in (A.7) are the estimates of marginal
benefit incidence. A value larger (or smaller) than one implies that the
corresponding group of households benefits more (or less) than the
average from an expansion in public programs and services.
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